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Philosophy and T heology
Is later abortion worse than early abortion? Would the discovery of a nonhuman 
rational animal change the personhood debate? Does an individual person arise 
only after the possibility of twinning is excluded? This reflection touches on these 
important questions.
Late versus Early Abortion
In a fascinating article, “Late- vs. Early-Term Abortion: A Thomistic Analysis” 
(The Thomist, January 2007), Andrew J. Peach argues that
the moral intuition that late-term abortions are more seriously wrong than 
earlier-term ones can be accounted for in a different way from the ways proposed 
by apologists for abortion. Defenders of abortion, it will be remembered, typi­
cally resort to a gradualist or achievement account of personhood in order to 
accommodate this intuition. On these accounts, late-term abortions are worse 
than earlier ones because the moral status of the fetus changes throughout or 
during pregnancy. However, by showing how circumstances affect the gravity 
of a human action and the culpability of a moral agent, one can account for 
the differences between early- and late-term abortions without compromising 
the conviction that all abortions are acts of murder and inherently wrong. One 
need not resort to a dubious account of personhood in order to account for this 
moral intuition. (139)
One way of accounting for the intuition is the additional evil of inflicting pain in 
late-term abortions but not in early-term abortions: “A murder that involves pain is, 
in itself, more grievous than one that does not. An abortion that is performed after 
the fetus is capable of feeling pain is, for that very reason, more seriously wrong 
than an abortion that is performed prior to the onset of this capacity. The infliction 
of pain need not enter into the act of murder, but when it does, it renders the act more 
grievous ‘by multiplying the ratio of evil,’ to use Thomas’s phrase” (126).
Of course, it is possible to remove this difference by simply anesthetizing the 
human fetus prior to a late-term abortion procedure, but in second- or third-trimester
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abortions as typically performed, this difference remains. Others might object that 
even the early fetus experiences pain, but the typical advocate of abortion denies 
this, so Peach’s argument would work at least dialectically on his opponent’s sup­
position. In any case, it is certainly true that some killing of early human life (say, 
killing embryos for research purposes) would involve no fetal or embryonic pain and 
therefore would be distinguishable from other forms of killing (partial-birth abortion) 
that, as typically performed, involve pain in a normal human fetus.
Second, there is ceteris paribus a difference in the effort required to sustain 
fetal life that morally distinguishes late and early abortions:
For the woman whose child has passed the point of viability, the effort involved 
to spare the life of that child is little, if at all, greater than that involved in in­
ducing labor and delivering the child.[1] In earlier stages of pregnancy, say at 
around four weeks, the woman who no longer wishes to carry the fetus would 
have to endure approximately twenty more weeks of pregnancy, as well as 
inducement and labor, to secure the independent existence of the fetus. To do 
what is good is easier in the former case than in the latter, and so to fail to do 
what is good in the former case is worse than to fail to do so in the latter. That 
it is a less-grievous moral offense to fail in what is more difficult than in what 
is less difficult clearly resonates with our moral intuitions regarding late- and 
early-term abortions. (127)
As a counter-example, consider a woman who suddenly has to endure bed rest for 
the last three months of pregnancy, or who is undergoing health problems in later 
pregnancy. She might very well experience the remaining months of the pregnancy 
as more difficult and requiring greater effort than a healthy woman does during 
an entire pregnancy. Nevertheless, Peach’s general point would hold if it were 
understood as defending a prima facie moral difference between early-term and 
late-term abortion.
Third, Peach points out that as a pregnancy develops it becomes more and 
more difficult to be inculpably ignorant of the humanity of the unborn. Early in 
pregnancy, it is more plausible that the human fetus is merely a “bunch of cells” that 
are not really alive, but as pregnancy progresses, fetal movement and sometimes 
hiccups make such suppositions more difficult to maintain. Vivid three-dimensional 
ultrasound images taken in later pregnancy make the humanity of the unborn even 
harder to deny. Insofar as involuntary ignorance is, in a typical case, more likely 
early than later in pregnancy, culpability will be less for early abortion than for later 
abortion (135).
1 The contention that continuing pregnancy after viability requires little or no effort 
outside of labor and delivery is false. After viability, much effort is involved in continuing 
a pregnancy, since walking, sitting, and doing other activities typically becomes much more 
challenging as the unborn child grows larger. In addition, for at least some women, morning 
sickness continues even into the second and third trimesters. Still, just as carrying a load 
for ten miles is more difficult than carrying it for two miles, ceteris paribus more effort is 
required to finish carrying a child to term when thirty-six weeks of pregnancy remain than 
when ten weeks remain.— C.K.
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Again, there may be cases when this difference is not in play. Someone well 
versed in the facts of fetal development may be more culpable for having an early 
abortion than a mentally handicapped woman aborting later in pregnancy. Still, 
if the point is to make a prima facie case that there is greater culpability for later 
abortion than for early abortion, the point remains true despite differences in cases 
where other things are not equal.
Fourth, Peach argues that
when a woman first becomes aware ofthe pregnancy, the passions are most likely 
to be at their highest intensity: dread of the burden of carrying the baby arises, 
apprehension and anxiety at the notion of being a parent for the first time or 
of having to parent another child, the fear of being financially and emotionally 
abandoned by the biological father, etc. When one considers that these passions 
surface all at once at the onset of pregnancy and when the developing human 
being is at its earliest developmental stages—when it does not “look like a baby” 
yet—then one can understand how easy it can be for a person, out of weakness 
and due to difficult circumstances, to fail to apply the general prohibition against 
murder to the particular case of the person in the womb. (135-136)
By contrast, to choose late-term abortion after having gotten through the initial 
trauma and having withstood the stormy anxiety of learning the shocking news of 
pregnancy seems to be more deliberate and therefore more blameworthy. As time 
passes, passions cool and the expectation of reasonable action increases (136).
One difficulty with this argument is that it does not apply in all cases to dis­
tinguish early from later abortion. In some cases of late-term abortion, the mother 
may wish to terminate the pregnancy because of a diagnosis of fetal handicap that 
can only be made later in pregnancy. The emotional trauma brought on by the news 
of a malformed unborn child late in pregnancy may be no less severe than the dis­
tress brought about by the early discovery of an unwanted pregnancy. In addition, it 
can happen that a woman with irregular cycles or obesity only discovers that she is 
pregnant in the second or third trimester. Still, these exceptions do not undermine 
the general thesis that late-term abortion is more morally problematic than early- 
term abortion ceteris paribus.
Fifth, Peach points to the fact that, in general, expectant parents experience 
late-term miscarriages as more traumatic than early miscarriages:
Even if they feel or have judged that abortion is a necessary evil, all things 
considered, their sense of remorse and loss would have to be more palpable or 
intense given the level of development of the child; what has been taken away 
cannot plausibly be denied. This must be particularly true for the woman, whose 
attachment to the person in her womb presumably develops as the child devel­
ops. Just as, in general, late-term miscarriages are likely to impact a woman 
(or couple) more severely than early-term ones, late-term abortions must surely 
impact a woman (or couple) more severely than early-term ones. (138)
Anecdotally, it does seem to be the case that late miscarriages are more traumatic for 
women (and couples) than early miscarriages. Does it follow that late abortions are 
morally worse than early abortions? Does an attachment develop between the mother 
and the child through the course of pregnancy such that the greater the attachment 
the worse it is to detach? Generally, the length of a relationship seems to have some
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bearing on the loss involved when the relationship ends. To end a marriage after 
three weeks involves a less serious loss than ending it after three decades. Perhaps 
this helps explain in part why later abortion is worse than early abortion, without at 
all denying that every abortion is a matter of grave, intrinsic injustice which ends 
the life of an innocent human being.
Although I have raised questions about Peach’s five arguments that late abortion 
is worse than early abortion in terms of circumstances and moral culpability—and 
although late and early abortions are equally unjust in terms of the intentional kill­
ing of innocent unborn human persons—it would seem that Peach’s arguments are 
sound so long as they are understood as not being exceptionless but rather ceteris 
paribus considerations.
An interesting question is why such distinctions do not find any echo in the 
contemporary magisterial teaching on abortion. Would such an emphasis help or 
harm evangelization toward a gospel of life? This question may also be related to the 
various strategies undertaken by pro-life advocates to end abortion. Some, such as 
Hadley Arkes, seek to end all abortion incrementally by focusing on issues, such as 
partial-birth abortion, supported by public opinion.2 Others, most notably perhaps 
Colin Harte in Changing Unjust Laws Justly: Pro-Life Solidarity with the “Last 
and the Least” (2005), argue that this incremental approach is unjust and inevitably 
leads to a distortion of the pro-life point of view. Peach’s analysis does not definitely 
answer the question of approach, but it may prove useful in reconciling pro-lifers 
divided on political strategy as well as reconciling church teaching on abortion as 
intrinsically evil with the “commonsense” view of many Americans that late abor­
tion is worse than early abortion.
Personhood and Rational Capacity
In his book Abortion and Unborn Human Life (1996), Patrick Lee provides 
a powerful philosophical defense of the intrinsic wrongfulness of abortion. In two 
recent articles in Bioethics—“The Pro-Life Argument from Sustantial Identity: A 
Defence” (June 2004) and “Substantial Identity and the Right to Life: A Rejoinder to 
Dean Stretton” (February 2007)—Lee defends his book and his view that all human 
beings by nature have a right to life, against criticisms raised by another philosopher, 
Dean Stretton.3 The exchange is crisp, clear philosophy, taking up issues such as 
the difference between human beings and nonrational animals, the importance of 
natural capacities in distinction from developed capacities, and responses to bizarre 
examples of human brain transplants in animals and puppies with rationality. Lee’s 
responses to criticism leave his case intact, but I would like to consider further one 
of the points Stretton raises.
2 Hadley Arkes, “This Heartbreaking Court,” First Things 166 (October 2006): 11-14.
3 Dean Stretton, “The Argument from Intrinsic Value: A Critique,” Bioethics 14.3 
(July 2000): 228-239, and “Essential Properties and the Right to Life: A Response to Lee,” 
Bioethics 18.3 (June 2004): 264-282.
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A bizarre scenario that Dean Stretton borrows from Jeff McMahan is of dogs 
with a latent brain mechanism that, with years of cognitive therapy occupying virtu­
ally every waking hour, eventually allows them to function in a rational way. These 
dogs would have a (weak) rational capacity, and the question is, would they also have 
a right to life? If Lee answers no, these dogs do not have a right to life, then he has 
in fact conceded that natural capacities do not give rise to the right to life. If Lee 
answers that they do have a right to life, then he embraces an untenable conclusion 
(argues Stretton) that goes against our intuitions: dogs have a right to life.
Lee responds that “it is not plausible that an animal would have a latent 
capacity for rationality and self-consciousness but not manifest that capacity given 
a reasonably favorable environment” (“Substantial Identity,” 95). However, bizarre 
counter-examples are by their very nature not plausible. One could rule out such 
examples, but they seem to be a standard tool of contemporary analytic philosophy 
to, among other purposes, enable one to distinguish conceptually that which—in 
reality—one finds linked up together. Lee rightly notes that the moral conclusions 
we can draw from our intuitions about bizarre examples is tentative, “partly because 
the scenario is so extraordinary, there is reason both to doubt what people’s intuitions 
about it would be and to disagree with their intuitions if they clashed with basic 
moral principles” (95).
In a certain sense, the rational puppy scenario is not that bizarre, for certain in­
dividual rational animals, mentally handicapped human beings, may find themselves 
in situations not altogether different from the situation of the dogs in the example. 
They may be able to function rationally only if a massive effort is made by those 
around them to give them what other human beings can attain effortlessly. Unless 
Stretton would deny the right to life to human beings with serious mental handicaps, 
then it would seem that the dogs in question would also have a right to life. “If the 
dogs really did have a basic, natural capacity for conceptual thought and free choice, 
but (inexplicably) could actualize that capacity only through gargantuan efforts, 
why should this last fact determine whether or not they are intrinsically valuable as 
subjects of rights?” (95). Of course, if dogs, cats, or horses really were rational, then 
it would turn out that they are radically different creatures than we had previously 
thought. It might be appropriate to rename them, snoopies or garfields or mistereds, 
or perhaps even more appropriately to have them name themselves. Further, just 
because someone can recover a natural capacity with a gargantuan effort, it does 
not follow that such an effort must be made. Similarly, life is always a good, but 
we need not do everything in our power, no matter what the circumstances and no 
matter what the cost, to preserve human life.
Cell Growth and Potentiality
In an article titled “Individuality and Human Beginnings: A Reply to David 
DeGrazia,” Alfonso Gomez-Lobo of Georgetown University and the President’s 
Council on Bioethics brings important considerations to bear on criticisms of the 
proposition that “we originate as single-cell zygotes at the time of conception” (Jour­
nal o f  Law, Medicine & Ethics, Fall 2007, 457). A standard objection to this view is 
that fact that a zygote can twin, and therefore (it is argued) must not have been an
165
The N ational Catholic B ioethics Quarterly +  Spring 2008
individual at the time of conception, but rather a “mass of tissue” from which could 
arise several individuals. Of course, if there is no individual present, then there is no 
“person” according to the classic Boethian definition of a person as an individual 
substance of a rational nature.4
Gomez-Lobo shows that there is no necessary link between indivisibility and 
individuality, noting that “If indivisibility were a necessary condition for individu­
ality, then there would be no material individuals. After all, any material object 
can be pulled apart of dismantled. No car would be an individual car, but only a 
collection or package of car parts, likewise no living body would be an individual 
organism, but only a colony of cells” (458). Obviously then, individuality does not 
require indivisibility.
What if we slightly change the necessary condition and say that “if a living or­
ganism can give rise to other living organisms by fission,” then it is not an individual? 
Gomez-Lobo responds, “On the assumed criterion you could never have, say, three 
individual amoebas on a lab dish because each of them can divide and reproduce 
by fission. Nor could you have six because the ones resulting from the division can 
in turn be divided, etc. In the case of amoebas, we cannot even have recourse to the 
alternative that they are a mere collection of cells: amoebas are single-cell organisms” 
(458). Thus, the ability to give rise to others by means of fission does not exclude 
individuality, unless one wants to say, rather implausibly, that there is no such thing 
as an individual amoeba, no such thing as three amoebas, etc.
Another argument examined by Gomez-Lobo is that with cloning any cell 
of the human body has the potential to become a full grown human being, and so 
the fact that the zygote has potential to develop into a mature human being makes 
it no more important—on that account—than any skin or hair cell. Every cell in 
the human body has the potential (through cloning) to become a full grown human 
being, but obviously every human cell does not have an inalienable right to life. So 
too, the zygote does not have an inalienable right to life based on its potentiality to 
become a mature human being.
Gomez-Lobo indicates a difficulty with this view:
It is plainly false that each somatic cell has the potential to become an organism.
In terms of its epigenetic state, each of those cells is at an end-stage or unipotent 
state. The technician performing the cloning extracts a nucleus (thereby destroy­
ing the original somatic cell and any potentiality it may have had) and inserts it 
in an enucleated ovum. The expectation is that the cytoplasm of the ovum will 
reprogram that nucleus so that it reverts to zygote stage. Not the original somatic 
cell, but the new cell, the one that starts to live with the reprogrammed nucleus 
directing the genetic development of the material provided by the ovum, is the 
one that has the potentiality to generate a full-grown organism. (461)
This critique depends on what constitutes a cell, for one might respond (contrary to 
the standard view that the nucleus is a part of a cell) that the “cell” is essentially the
4 David DeGrazia, “Moral Status, Human Identity, and Early Embryos: A Critique of 
the President’s Approach,” Journal o f  Law, Medicine & Ethics 34.1 (Spring 2006): 49-57.
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nucleus, with other parts such as the cell membrane, mitochondria, and cytoplasm 
being merely accidental properties like hair on a human being. Contemporary phi­
losophy is rife with competing accounts of what essentially constitutes a human be­
ing—brain alone, body and brain, soul and body, etc., and these discussions could in 
principle be mirrored by similar debates about what constitutes a cell. Gomez-Lobo’s 
critique works given standard accounts of the nature of a cell, but one could imagine 
critiques of the standard account as philosophically naive (although I am aware of 
no such discussion in the philosophy of biology). Such a response to Gomez-Lobo’s 
argument seems quite strained, to say the least.
In a sense, the argument from potentiality is misplaced. The standard pro-life 
position does not hinge on the potentiality of the embryo, fetus, or baby to become 
a functionally rational adult or, in DeGrazia’s words, “one of us.” The typical pro­
life view is that any human being in any stage of development—embryonic, fetal, 
or infantile—is already in its actual nature a rational animal, not potentially but 
already “one of us.” So arguments about whether a skin cell has potential to become 
one of us are irrelevant. No one argues that a skin cell is actually “one of us,” for it 
is merely a part of an individual. The real argument is about whether all human be­
ings in whatever stage of development count as “one of us” in terms of basic human 
rights, or only those who meet a certain standard of functioning.
Christopher Kaczor, Ph .D.
The Catholic University of America 
Washington, D.C.
167
